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Islamic Finance:
Issues Surrounding Islamic Law as a Choice of Law
under German Conflict of Laws Principles
Dr. Andreas Junius*
Two years ago, in the matter of Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco
PharmaceuticalsLtd,' the English Court of Appeal ("English Court") decided for
the first time questions of the validity, interpretation, and breadth of a choice of
law provision in a murabaha agreement. The judgment is of far-reaching
significance in the fields of Islamic finance and Shari'ah-compliant investments.2
This is because the English Court evaluated the agreement solely under English
law, even though the disputed choice of law provision stated that English law
was only to be applied "[s]ubject to the principles of the Glorious Sharia'a."'3 The
English Court qualified this clause as a nonbinding statement of purpose. As
Islamic investments and Islamic financial transactions become increasingly
relevant in the US and continental European countries, the decision is likely to
be considered by other courts in the future, and it is worth examining how
German courts may react. To be sure, the decision was made under English law.
Attorney-at-Law, New York, and Rechtsanwalt, Frankfurt am Main. The author would like to
express his gratitude to and acknowledge the valuable contributions of RechtsreferendarDr. Florian
Hoeld (now admitted to practice as Rechtsanwalt, Bonn, German manuscript), Benjamin Letzler
(Harvard Law School, English translation), and RechtsreferendarDr. Heiko Bertelmann (Hamburg,
editorial support) in the preparation of this Article.
1 1WLR 1784 (CA 2004) (UK) (hereinafter Beximco).
2

For summaries and comments, see Adam Greaves, Governing Law Clauses in Morabaha and Ijarab
Agreements: The Court of Appeal's Decision in Shamil Bank of Bahrain Ec v Beximco Pharmaceuticals
Limited and Others
(2004), available online at <http://www.steptoe.com/assets/
attachments/1 9.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007); Brewer Consulting, Choice of Law Clauses (2004),
available online at <http://www.brewerconsulting.co.uk/cases/CJ0449RR.htm> (visited Jan 15,
2007); Lovells, Sbariab Law in the English Courts (2004), available online
at
<http://www.yasaar.org/pubs/20259/ 2Shariah/2OLaw%20in%20the/o2OEnglish%2OCourts
% 20brochurel.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007); For a very instructive German law analysis, see Kilian
Bilz, Das islamische Recht als1Verragsstatut? (Zur Entscheidung des London High Court v. 1. 8. 2003,
Shamil Bank of Bahrain v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Others), IPRax 44 (Jan/Feb 2005).

3

Beximco T 1.

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

The Beximco decision may nonetheless influence courts in other countries and
not only those within the Anglo-American tradition.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE MATTER IN DISPUTE:
ISLAMIC FINANCE
Factors driving the growing demand for Islamic finance products and
Shari'ah-compliant investment opportunities for both borrowers and investors
include the ongoing high price of oil, near-peak capacity oil production, and a
growing commitment to religious codes of conduct in the Muslim world. This
has led to the introduction of Islamic principles to broad reaches of economic
activity. Recent years have seen the establishment of increasing numbers of
Islamic financial institutions worldwide. A specifically Islamic capital market is
now emerging and solidifying alongside conventional capital markets.4 The
central characteristic of the Islamic financial system, apart from the prohibition
of a number of trades considered religiously objectionable and illegal, 5 is a
comprehensive prohibition against the charging of interest (riba).6 Obviously,
this prohibition is diametrically opposed to the essential importance of interest
in modern banking. Muslim enterprises and Islamic financial institutions are
required to do business on a wholly Shari'ah-compliant basis including their
cross-border dealings and global investments. In this context, a widespread
4

See Babback Sabahi, Islamic Financial Structures as Alternatives to International Loan Agreements:
Challengesfor U.S. FinandalInstitutions, 24 Ann Rev Banking & Fin L 487, 488 (2005); Kimberly J.
Tacy , Islamic Finance:A Groming Industry in the United States, 10 NC Banking Inst 355, 355 (2006);
and Faisal Atbani, Islamic Legal Authoriiesfor the Islamic Banking System: The Authorsaion of ShaiahCompliantBanks in the United Kingdom, 27 Co Lawyer 54 (2006).

5
6

Unacceptable businesses include those involving alcohol, gambling, pork, and pornography.
On Islamic finarice, see generally Chibli Mallat, ed, Islamic Law and Finance (Graham & Trotman
1988); Paul S. Mills and John R. Presley, Islamic Finance. Theory and Practice (MacMillan 1999);
Sabahi, 24 Ann Rev Banking & Fin L at 4 8 9 -91 (cited in note 4); Tacy, 10 NC Banking Inst at
356 (cited in note 4); Atbani, 27 Co Lawyer at 54-55 (cited in note 4); Killian Bilz, Islamic Banking:
Ein Wachstumsmarkt ftr Deutsche und Internationale Banken (Gleiss Lutz 2005), available online at
<http://www.gleisslutz.com/_cms/pubication/nur_employee/de/142.html>
(visited Jan 15,
2007); Killian Bilz, Finanrertmit Goltes Hilfe, Zenith Bus 35, 36 (Mar 2005); Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer, Islamic Finance: Basic Pindples and Structures (2006), available online at
<http://www.freshfields.com/pubfications/pdfs/2006/13205.pdf>
(visited Jan 15, 2007);
Michael J.T. McMillen, Islamic Capital Markets: Developments and Issues, 1 Cap Mkts L J 136, 138
(Nov 2006), available online at <http://cmlj.oxfordjoumals.org/cgi/reprint/1/2/136> (visited
Jan 15, 2007); Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo and Michael J.T. McMillen, Law and Islamic Finance: An
Interactive Anaysis in Rifaat Ahmed, Abdel Karim, and Simon Archer, eds, Islamic Finance: The
Regulatory Challenge 136--201 (Wiley 2007); Michael J.T. McMillen, Sbari'a-CompliantFinance Structures
and the Development of an Islamic Economy, in Islamic Finance: Dynamics and Development: Proceedings of the
Fifth Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance 89 (Harvard 2003).
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financing concept is the murabaha.7 This method of financing was also the basis
of the decision of the English Court.
The murabahais a short-term business financing, often referred to as "costplus financing" or "mark-up sale." In this sort of financing, the bank, acting for
a customer, buys a commercial good from a supplier and then resells the good to
the customer at a contractually specified mark-up (either a percentage or a lump
sum). This entails two different contractual relationships: a purchase agreement
between the bank and the supplier and an additional purchase agreement
between the bank and the customer. Though the bank pays the purchase price
immediately to the supplier, it defers receipt of the resale purchase price from
the customer. In lieu of interest, the bank then charges a "mark-up" or "cost
plus" as payment for extending the purchase price in advance. Through the use
of two purchase agreements and no credit agreement in the classic sense, the
bank receives-from a legal standpoint-no interest, only profits from a sale.
This is viewed as permissible in Islam.' At times, agency agreements under
property law are reached pursuant to which the customer takes possession of the
goods directly from the supplier on behalf of the bank.9 The rules, like those in
all areas of business, are not uniform because no single codification of the
Shari'ah exists. Differences between regions and even between individual
Shari'ah scholars are not uncommon.
It would be wrong to characterize the murabaha as circumvention of the
interest prohibition. As Balz notes, the murabahais an alternative financing form
with its own risks. 10 For example, there are greater risks for the banks than in
classic lending because property ownership and financing are combined."
Furthermore, as real intermediaries, the banks face difficulties such as
assumption of risk, guarantees, insurance, default, and maintenance. These
difficulties are widely viewed as a necessity in order to be recognized as a
genuine murabaha transaction and not as a circumvention of the prohibition on
interest.
Default interest is also impermissible under Islamic law. To address this,
"discounts" are routinely negotiated for timely payment.'" Obviously, such
discounts have the disadvantage of being static and limited. Therefore, recourse
7

See Bilz, Islamic Banking at 5 (cited in note 6); Biilz, Zenith Bus at 36 (cited in note 6); Freshfields,
Islamic Financeat 3 (cited in note 6); Sabahi, 24 Ann Rev Banking & Fin L at 495 (cited in note 4);
and Tacy, 10 NC Banking Inst at 357-58 (cited in note 4).

8

B i1z, Islamic Banking at 5 (cited in note 6).

9

Freshfields, Islamic Finance at 4 (cited in note 6).
Bilz, Islamic Banking at 5 (cited in note 6).

10
11
12

Id.
Freshfields, Islamic Finance at 7 (cited in note 6).
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is sometimes made to "late fees." 13 The general risk of the customer breaching
the contract and refusing acceptance of the goods also exists. Here, Islamic
finance uses breakage fees to protect against this risk.14 Lastly, a bank entering
into a murababa financing requires security in return for extending credit. The
bank has a substantial interest in securing its deferred claim to payment of the
purchase price. Ways to address this need include both personal and real security
interests. In the case underlying15 the Beximco decision, the bank's claim to
payment was secured by sureties.
In practice, the aforementioned risks are also generally minimized by
drafting the contract so as to distribute risk as closely as possible to the
distribution under letter-of-credit financing. It is a common practice for the
bank to refuse explicitly any guarantee and to place transportation risks with the
customer. In return, the bank cedes to the customer its guarantee claims against
the supplier. 6 Similar terms and conditions are used in the field of lease
financing. It is, therefore, fair to say that in their economic effect, murababa
lending structures, though they can
structures often approximate interest-based
7
construct.'
to
be legally difficult
In the case decided by the English Court, the customer fell into arrears,
and Shamil Bank, an Islamic bank, sued for payment in the London High Court.
The murabaha agreement contained the following choice of law provision:
"Subject to the principles of the Glorious Sharia'a, this Agreement shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England."' 8 Because
the only legal difficulties with the contract were those under Islamic law, the
London High Court looked to the complex set of issues surrounding the
questions of whether the principles of Shari'ah had in fact been violated and
whether the court should reach that question at all. Since no court had
previously addressed these issues, the English Court had occasion to break new
ground in judging them.
B. THE BEXIMCO DISPUTE
Beximco argued that it was not obligated to pay because the agreement
violated Islamic law and thus was wholly invalid.' 9 Beximco further argued that

13

Id.

14

Blz, Islamic Banking at 6 (cited in note 6).

15

Beximco

16

Bilz, Islamic Banking at 6 (cited in note 6).

17

See also Blz, IPRax at 44 (cited in note 2).

18

Beximco

1.

19

Beximco

27.

25.
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the choice of law provision in dispute should be interpreted to mean that the
mutual rights and obligations arising from the agreement would only be binding
and actionable if they conformed with the principles of both the Shari'ah and
English private law.20 These preconditions were not fulfilled because the
agreement violated Islamic law. Beximco remarked that the murabaha financing
in question was, in truth, a hidden loan at interest and thus prohibited by Islamic
law.2' This defense is astounding since the parties had agreed on a murabaha
financing, and the Beximco Shari'ah Board" had approved the transaction. Yet,
come to closely
as discussed above, murabaha financings in practice have
23
approximate the conventional forms of business financing.

11. THE DECISION OF THE ENGLISH COURT
The English Court, by upholding the decision of the London High Court,
explicitly rejected Beximco's argument. The English judges found that the
agreement was subject solely to English law, and that a review for legality under
Islamic law was not appropriate. The English Court emphasized at the outset
that it would be non-justiciable, and therefore impossible for contracts, to be
subject to two different legal systems since the relevant Rome Convention on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations states that "[a] contract shall be
governed by the law chosen by the paries.' , 24 This needs to be read in conjunction
with Article 1 of the Rome Convention, according to which the rules of the
Convention "shall apply to contractual obligations in any situation involving a
choice between the laws of different countries. 2 ' This means that only the
choice of a national legal system is a valid choice of law. The Rome Convention
as a whole does not contemplate the choice of a non-state legal system such as
Islamic law.26 In addition, the English Court characterized the principles of
Shari'ah as representing a socio-religious code of conduct, something different
from, and at the same time more and less than, a classic state legal system.

23

Id.
id.
Shari'ah boards are internally appointed institutions that oversee the work of Islamic banks, and
which must approve transactions from a religious perspective. The Boards are made up of
members who have been educated or have taught at highly prestigious contemporary Shari'ah
schools. Freshfields, Islamic Financeat 2 (cited in note 6).
Bilz, Islamic Banking at 5 (cited in note 6).

24

Beximco

23

Id at art 1, § 1.
Beximco T 48.

20
21

22

26

48 (citing Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980),
art 3, § 1, 19 ILM 1492, available online at <http://www.rome-convention.org/instruments
/iconv_cons_en.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007) (emphasis added)).

Winter 2007

ChicagoJournalof InternafionalLaw

Islamic law, in the view of the English Court, was also insufficiently determinate
since it is debated even among its own legal scholars, and on the whole
inadequately codified.2 7 The English Court further found it highly improbable
that the parties to the contract would wish for a secular English court to decide a
legal dispute on the basis of Islamic law.28 This reasoning by the English Court
upheld the lower court's observation that there was no compelling interest to
examine religious questions, since the Shari'ah boards of the relevant parties had
already done so and passed their judgment. 29 Both the English Court and the
London High Court thus reached the result that the contractual reference to
Islamic law was nothing more than a nonbinding statement of purpose by the
bank to pursue Shari'ah-compliant financing.3 0 The English Court concluded
with the self-confident assertion that English law, distinguished internationally
for its popularity and high quality, should not be diluted by religious principles.31
In doing so, the English Court rejected the defense by noting that the
commercial reality of the agreement was clear to both parties from the
beginning, and this reality must be considered in interpreting the agreement. 2 A
loan transaction was hidden in murabahaclothing.
The English Court made it unmistakably clear that it would generally
uphold agreements in which religious Islamic parties are participants so long as
the agreements can be reconciled with English law. Furthermore, English courts
will not take the place of the Shari'ah boards by reviewing a contract's
consistency with Islamic law. The judgment takes care to secure substantial legal
certainty for financial institutions. It thus shifts and reduces the particularities of
Islamic finance to the preparation of the contract and the internal review of the
relevant materials. This ultimately makes dependable legal advice necessary.
III. ISLAMIC LAW AS A CHOICE OF LAW UNDER GERMAN
CONFLICT OF LAWS DOCTRINE
The following discussion aims to consider how a German court would
treat the choice of law provision selected by the parties in the Beximco case.
This question was initially addressed by Kilian Balz in his commentary on the
first impression decision of the London High Court, the lower court. It is of
growing practical relevance, however, not only because the English Court
27

Id

55.

28

Id

29

Id

41 (discussing the lower court rationale).
54.

30

Id

31

Id.

32

Id

40, 54.

47.
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confirmed the lower court's decision, but also because Continental legal systems,
including German law, are gaining prominence alongside the classic choices of
English and American law, as options for investors from the Persian Gulf.
German-based assets are becoming increasingly attractive to these investors for
a variety of reasons. The applicability of German law will therefore play an
increasingly significant role in the future.
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREE CHOICE OF LAW

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the law that governs in a conflict
between multiple legal systems is determined under German International
Private Law (InternationalesPrivatrech), which is codified in the second chapter of
the EinJhrungsgesetZ zum Biirgerlichen GesetZbuch ("EGBGB") .3 The relevant
provision for contractual obligations states the basic rule that the contract will be
subject to the law chosen by the parties (the principle of the free choice of law).
The choice of law must be made explicitly or must derive with sufficient
certainty from the provisions of the contract or the totality of the circumstances
of the case. The parties may make a choice of law effective for the entire
contract or only for a single part. The obvious precondition for the latter is that
the contract be logically divisible.34 In theory, the parties to Shari'ah-compliant
transactions have three options: the agreement may be subject solely to Islamic
law, subject solely to a state legal system (with purely internal Shari'ah
compliance), or subject to a mixed system pairing a state legal system with
35
typical Islamic principles.
If the law to be applied is not agreed upon under EGBGB, Article 27,
Paragraph 1, then EGBGB, Article 28, Paragraph 1, makes the contract subject
to the law of the state with which it displays the closest connections. There is,
however, an important exception to these principles: a legal norm of another
state will not be applied when its application leads to a result that is clearly
incompatible with the essential principles of German law. 36 EGBGB, Article 6,
Sentence 2, places particular emphasis on applications of foreign law that are
incompatible with German constitutional or human rights. The specific result of

33

35

Einfiihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (EGBGB) (Introductory Act to the Civil Code)
Sept 24, 1994, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBI. 1), as amended, art 27 1.
Andreas Heidrich, Artice 27, in Otto Palandt, Biigerfiches GesetZbucb (German Civil Code) 9 at
2582 (Munchen 65th ed 2006) (discussing EGBGB, art 27); Dieter Martiny, Article 27, in Kurt
Rebmann, Franz Jiirgen Siicker, and Roland Rixecker, eds, 10 Miinchener Kommentar zum Bfirgerlichen
GesetZbuch 70 at 1703 (CH Beck 4th ed 2006) (discussing EGBGB, art 27).
Atbani, 27 Co Lawyer at 55 (cited in note 4).

36

This is the so-called ordrepublic,referred to in Article 6 of the EGBGB, also referred to as public

34

policy.
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the application of the law (not the norm itself) must be entirely unbearable in the
individual case.3" The violation must be considerable and must go against the
basic values of German law. In addition, the ordre public requires a sufficient
relationship to Germany.38 Also, such a norm will not be applied if it violates
internationally mandatory German law,3 9 that is, a rule of domestic German law
that is so essential that it is intended to prevail over an otherwise valid choice of
law.
B. THE INTERPRETATION OF UNCLEAR CHOICE OF
LAW CLAUSES
A contract's choice of law, when unambiguously made, generally means
that there will be no difficulty in selecting the relevant law to apply. Unclear
choice of law clauses, by contrast, require interpretation. This applies both to
content and scope, as is made clear by the English Court's decision in favor of
English law. The situation under German law is similar: for statutory
interpretation, EGBGB, Article 32, Paragraph 1, dictates that the applicable law
selected under EGBGB, Article 27, Paragraph 1, is also the law used in its
interpretation.4 ° Under German law, the interpretation of unclear choice of law
clauses is governed by general principles of interpretation under contract law.
The interpretation of declarations of intent under contract law is determined
from the point of view of the counterparty, who is assumed to use an objective
standard. 4' This also follows from EGBGB, Article 27, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2,
which states that the choice of law must derive with sufficient objective certainty
from the provisions of the contract and the surrounding circumstances. Here the
principles of interpretation include not only an interpretation based on the literal
wording, but also on teleology and systematics.
On the interpretation of choice of law clauses, the German Federal Court
of Justice ("German Court") has decided that while the wording of the relevant
clause needs to be examined, the requirements for the clarity of a choice of law
clause may not be set too high. 2 The German Court held that, for the choice of
law as well as a subsequent amendment thereto according to EGBGB, Article
27, Paragraph 2, it is sufficient that the relevant intent of the contractual parties
37
38

39
40

41

42

See Heldrich, Article 6 4 at 2491-92 (cited in note 34).
See Heldrich, Arile 6 6 at 2492 (cited in note 34).
EGBGB, BGBI. 1 at art 34 (cited in note 33).
EGBGB, BGB1. 1 at art 32 1 (cited in note 33).

Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) (Federal Court of Justice) May 18, 1998, 1998 Neue Juristische UWochenschrift
(NJW) 2966 (FRG).
Bundesgerchtshof (BGH) (Federal Court of Justice) Jan 19, 2000, 2000 Neue Jurisische WochenschriftRechtsprechungs-Report (NJW-RR) 1002 (FRG).
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followed from the clause itself or from the circumstances. In that regard, the
express reference to provisions of a certain law shall, according to the German
Court, indicate a tacit choice of law.43
Like the English Court, therefore, a German court would also interpret
choice of law clauses that are not entirely clear. If one looks at the choice of law
clause that was at issue in the English Court's decision, one is faced with the
problem that both the wording as well as the teleological construction, each
viewed individually, permit diverging interpretations. Furthermore, the clause
does not favor one interpretation over another. The choice of English law
subject to Islamic principles, however, shows that the agreement should not just
be subject to English law but also subject to Islamic principles of law. It shows
that the contractual parties emphasized, on the one hand, conformity with
Islamic law, not the least because the financing method originated especially
from the requirements of Islamic law. On the other hand, the reference to
English law shows the intention to base the agreement on a solid and reliable
body of law. Based on a literal interpretation, one cannot simply view the
proviso at issue as a mere programmatic statement that need not be recognized.
It is therefore surprising, at first glance, that neither the English Court nor the
lower court decision discusses the various interpretive possibilities based on the
wording. But in the final analysis, that discussion was circumvented given the
decision that Islamic law is not a valid governing law. 44
A plausible way to interpret the clause would be that English law should
apply to the extent that it does not collide with Islamic law principles. In
instances in which English and Islamic law conflict, Islamic law should prevail.
If that were the right interpretation, a national secular court could potentially be
forced to take evidence on the principles of Shari'ah and, in the final analysis, to
decide upon them. The English Court expressed that opinion in reference to
specific substantive law that was sufficiently clear.45 In this context, the
determination of how the two legal systems relate to each other would become
relevant. One could also conclude that the choice of law clause, if interpreted in
that fashion, would be deemed as not having made any valid choice of law at all.
Under EGBGB, Article 28, Paragraph 1, this would lead to the application of
the law of the state that has the closest connection with the agreement. One
would not get to that point in a German court, however, if, as the English Court

43

Id at
23 (citing Bundesgerichtshof (BGIH) (Federal Court of Justice) May 10, 1996, 1996 Neue
Juistische Wochenschnft-Rechtsprechungs-Report (NJW-RR) 1034 and Bundesgericbtshof (BGH) (Federal
Court ofJusice)Jan 14, 1999, 1999 Weripapiermiteilungen(W(M) 1177 (FRG)).

44

Beximco

45

Id.
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determined for English law,46 Islamic law is not a contractually valid choice of
law.
C. ISLAMIC LAW AS A LEGAL SYSTEM CAPABLE OF
BEING CHOSEN
Whether Islamic law can be chosen appears to be problematic in various
respects. It is clear, however, that the requirements of EGBGB, Article 27,
Paragraph 1, play a pivotal role in this respect.
1. Requirement of the Choice of a State Law
According to EGBGB, Article 27, Paragraph 1, an agreement is governed
by the "law" chosen by the parties. The prevailing view among German legal
scholars is that the term "law" in the context of EGBGB, Article 27, means the
law of a state.47 This follows readily from the wording of the provision.
EGBGB, Article 27, Paragraph 3, talks about "the law of another state" or refers
to the law of "that state." In addition, the legislative history of the provision
confirms that the term "law" means the law of a specific state. 48 Furthermore,
other statutes differentiate between legal provisions in general and those of a
state, as Balz correctly points out. 49 For instance, Section 1051, Paragraph 1,
Sentence 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, ° which relates to arbitration
proceedings, provides that the court of arbitration must decide the dispute in
accordance with the legal provisions that the parties have identified as applicable
to the cause of action. The second sentence of the provision then specifically
deals with "the law or the legal order of a specific state." With reference to the
genesis of this provision, it is interpreted such that it also allows the application
of other, non-state-based legal principles.5 ' Consequently, that provision
specifically allows the choice of not only state-based law but also the law of a
46

Id.

47

Heldrich, Arie 27 $ 3 at 2580-81 (cited in note 34); Martiny, Aricle 27 28 at 1686, 33 at 1690
(cited in note 34) (discussing EGBGB, art 27); Gerhard Hohloch, Einfuihrungsgeselz um Bit gerlichen
Gesetqbuch, in Harm Peter Westermann, ed, Erman, Kommentar um Bilgerliches Gesetqbuch 9 at 5631
(Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt 11 th ed 2004) (discussing EGBGB, art 27); Christian von Bar and Peter
Mankowski, 1 Internalionales Privatrecht § 2
86 (CH Beck 2d ed 2003); Jan Kropholler,
InternaionalesPrivatrecht § 52 II (3)(e) (Mohr Siebeck 4th ed 2001); Ulrich Magnus, Arhide 27, in
Ulrich Magnus, ed, 14 J. von Staudinger, Kommentar Zum Buergerlichen Geset buch mit Einfiihrungsgesetq
und NebengesetZen T 49 at 120 (Sellier 2002) (focusing on lex mercatoria).
See Bilz, IPRax at 45 (cited in note 2).

48

50

Id.
Zivilprozefordnung (ZPO) (civil procedure statute) May 12, 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBI) I, as

51

amended.
See generally, Bilz, IPRax at 45 nn 14-16 (cited in note 2).

49

Vo. 7 No. 2

Issues Surrounding Islamic Law as a Choice of Law

Junius

non-state legal order. But it is limited in its application to arbitration proceedings
and there appears to be no compelling reason to extend its application by way of
analogy. Since German law does not allow the election of non-state law, Islamic
law cannot be chosen as the law to govern a contract. As the English Court
correctly pointed out, Islamic law is not state law, but a religious-philosophical
code of conduct.5 2 Islamic law and the principles of Shari'ah are not codified as
state law, but rather based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah, which provide
citations, doctrines, and reported actions of the prophet Mohammed.
This interim result is not exceptional and certainly not exclusive to Islam.
It is common among all religious and philosophical codes of conduct that they
cannot be chosen as law to govern contractual relationships. For instance, a
choice of law clause that read, "subject to the principles of the Holy Bible,"
would not be enforceable in accordance with EGBGB,
Article 27, because the
53
Holy Scripture also does not constitute state law.
2. No Cumulative Choice of Different Legal Systems
As discussed above, the wording of the choice of law clause at issue
suggests that "subject to" means that the agreement would be governed by both
English and Islamic law and that, in case of conflict, the Shari'ah would prevail.
That result would contradict German choice of law principles because, as
discussed in the preceding section, Islamic law cannot be chosen as governing
law because it is not state law. It also violates the prohibition of choosing two
laws, as put forth in EGBGB, Article 27.
EGBGB, Article 27, Paragraph 1, provides that the agreement is subject to
the law chosen. That implies already that the statute assumes the choice of one
law. But, EGBGB, Article 27, Paragraph 1, Sentence 3, allows the parties to
choose different governing laws for different parts of the agreement. In
conjunction, this indicates that each part must be governed by one choice of law
and must not overlap with any other choice of law. This is the prevailing view
among German scholars, who also base their position on the inherent danger of

52

Beximco

53

Choice of law clauses subjecting the application of a certain state law to principles inherent in the
Bible are merely theoretical and practically would be of no relevance. Rules of conduct conveyed
by the Bible are not as detailed or far-reaching as the ones the Qur'an and the Shari'ah provide.
Related bodies of law, such as Kirchenrecht (Church law) or Staatskrchenrecht(public Church law) are
not amenable to choice of law clauses in commercial contracts, because the former presents the
internal organizational law that the religious communities set for themselves, while the latter
governs the relationship of the religious communities with the secular state. Both principles are
reflected in Article 140 of the GrundgesetZ (German constitution, Basic Law) in connection with
Article 137, 3, of the Imperial Constitution of the Weimar Republic.
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cumulatively be applicable to
contradicting results; if more than one law could
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uncertainty.
legal
create
would
it
an agreement,
If German law expressly allows the application of different laws to
different parts of the contract, one might ask whether the Shari'ah clause at
issue could be viewed in that way. This, however, is not the case. The clause is
not worded such that parts of the agreement are subject to English law and
other parts to Islamic law. If that had been the intention, then it would have
remained entirely unclear how the agreement would have to be divided. If one
were to allow a choice of both legal systems applicable to the same contractual
agreement, there would never be certainty whether, in this case, English law
would prevail because the Shari'ah is subject to interpretation by different
schools of thought and individual scholars. With this in mind, it is indeed
preferable that state law prevail, and, from a choice of law perspective, form the
sole basis for the agreement. That, however, leaves the question of what effect
reference to the Shari'ah actually has in a contract.
3. Islamic Principles Incorporated as Substantive Law
Bdlz is of the view that the clause "subject to the principles of the Glorious
Sharia'a" means, in substance, that the parties contractually agree that the
exercise of their rights is made subject to Islamic law permitting such exercise."
By way of contractual reference, Islamic law in its entirety thus becomes
incorporated into the contract. The references to Shari'ah were therefore made
on the substantive law level as distinct from the choice of law. That would mean
that non-mandatory provisions of German law that conflict with Islamic law
principles, such as provisions on default interest in the German Civil Code,
would, by virtue of subjection to the Shari'ah, be contractually excluded. When
in doubt, the agreement would have to be interpreted in light of the principles of
Islamic law. That way, the ethical-religious orientation of the transaction, which
by virtue of the conflict of laws principles embodied in the EGBGB would not
be recognized, could find recognition on the level of substantive law.
The overwhelming opinion in German legal literature is that reference to
substantive law embodied in non-state law is permissible, even if the dispute is
brought before a state court.56 By way of incorporation, contractual parties can
add rules embedded in state or non-state bodies of law to their contractual
agreement. This position is corroborated in the inverse sense by the limitations
on the extent to which foreign law can be incorporated into a contractual
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Heidrich, Article 27 9 at 2582 (cited in note 34); Biilz, IPRax at 44 (cited in note 2).
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B~lz, IPRax at 46 (cited in note 2).
Heidrich, Aricle 27 1 at 2580 (cited in note 34); Martiny, Article 27
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30 at 1688 (cited in note 34)

(discussing EGBGB, art 27); Magnus, Article 27 47 at 119 (cited in note 47).
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arrangement, namely, internationally mandatory German law (EGBGB, Article
34) and German public policy (EGBGB, Article 6). But these examples do not
allow the conclusion that a general reference to the Shari'ah would allow
incorporation of Islamic law in its entirety into the contractual agreement. This
would conflict with the requirement of determinability (Bestimmtheitsgebot) also
applicable to contract law. Islamic law or the Shari'ah, if referred to in the
proposed manner, is not sufficiently certain and cannot be ascertained."7
Conceivable in this context, but equally indeterminate, would be a reference to
specific rules of the Shari'ah. The incorporation of Islamic law in its totality as
non-state law would still be a violation of the prohibition in EGBGB, Article 27,
Paragraph 1, on cumulative choices of law. This cannot be circumvented by
moving the application from the choice of law level to the substantive law level.
Possible, and probably admissible under EGBGB, Article 27, Paragraph 1,
would be a reference to specific and determined rules or regulations. In that
case, the (secular) court would have to take evidence on the contents of the
foreign rule of law by way of expert testimony. As Balz concedes, this adds
another layer of complication with respect to Islamic law, because as discussed
above, many rules of the Shari'ah (especially their applications to specific factual
situations) are controversial among Islamic schools and individual scholars. 8
If, therefore, the contractual parties intend to incorporate individual
principles of Islamic law into the contract, this has to be done in a concrete,
specific manner, whether by specific reference to individual rules of the Shari'ah
(which would need to be spelled out) or by incorporating their specific content
into the agreement as such. Failing this, one should assume, as the English Court
did, that the general reference to Islamic law has to be viewed as a programmatic
statement by the financial institution indicating that their activities are guided by
the principles of Shari'ah. 9
IV.

CONCLUSION

In summary, German conflict of law rules do not allow incorporating
Islamic law as a legal order that can be chosen to govern agreements. This
57
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See Bdlz, IPRax at 46 (cited in note 2).
Id.
A related issue exists not in the context of choice of law clauses, but in corporate law: Islamic
investors, when incorporating legal entities abroad, frequently add to the purpose clause of the
articles of association or other constituent document a reference to the Shari'ah, such as, "The
corporation shall conduct its affairs in compliance with the principles of the glorious Shari'ah," or
the like. This creates complications and legal uncertainty, in particularly with respect to ultra tires
issues. It is, therefore, better practice to make this reference determinable by limiting it to specific
rulings of the company's Shari'ah Board. This may be achieved by adding to the above-referenced
clause: "as determined by the company's Shari'ah Board."
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follows from EGBGB, Article 27, which-as compared to Section 1051 of the
German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO)-only allows the choice of a foreign
state law. In addition, EGBGB, Article 27, prohibits a cumulative choice of law
such that the application of two legal systems to the same contractual provision
is not possible. Based on this, it may be assumed that a German court would
reject the choice of Islamic law as submitted in the case before the English
Court. Despite the reference to Shari'ah principles, the contract would be
exclusively interpreted in accordance with German law. Validity and
enforceability of contractual rights and obligations would exclusively be
governed by German civil law. But that does not leave devout Muslims and
other investors who want to conduct their affairs in a Shari'ah-compliant
fashion without means to achieve that goal. The focus, however, would be not
as much on the choice of law clause as on the specific contractual norm
requiring or prohibiting certain conduct in compliance with the Shari'ah. In
addition, parties may make the exercise of certain rights and obligations of the
agreement subject to approval by a Shari'ah board or other committee in which
they have confidence with respect to the application of the Qur'an and the
Shari'ah. This has become standard practice in the corporate scenario.
Because under German conflicts rules a choice of Islamic law or the
Shari'ah-to the extent it is not codified in state law-is not possible, parties
may ensure compliance with Islamic law principles by specific contractual
provisions while still relying on a solid and well-interpreted state legal order.
Mandatory German law or rules of German public policy that would contradict
and-from a German conflict perspective-prevail over the economic rules of
the Shari'ah have not come to our attention.60
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By way of example, the prohibition on charging interest or providing for default interest would
not contravene principles of fair dealing. See Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) (Civil Code) Jan 2,
2002, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBI) I, as amended, §242. Nor are they against good morals (kein
Verstoss gegen die Guten Siten). See Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) (Civil Code) Jan 2, 2002,
Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB) I, as amended, § 138,
1. They also do not lead to inappropriate
detriment for a contractual party. Biirgeriches Gesetzbuch (BGB) (Civil Code) Jan 2, 2002,
Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB1) I, as amended, § 307.
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